Group HW
Class 40
Piece 88

X 6B PART I

TYPEX

NFAK 621, etc.

6C
178

Closed :-

22nd September, 1945.

By Ginsburg

TOP SECRET

6(B)

Archives 5(1)

STATEMENTS BY PW Obstlt METTIG on T Y P E X

1. In homework completed about 24 Jul 45, he wrote (exact translation): "The Referat Zillmann, despite great efforts, was unable to break the English cipher machine. It is true that during the campaign in 1940 several English cipher machines were captured, but in all cases the wheels were missing." It should be ~~mentioned~~ noted that PW never mentioned TYPEX by name.

2. On Sunday, 29 Jul 45, IO, in consultation with Major Morgan, asked PW directly whether the Germans had worked on TYPEX. The reply was in the affirmative. PW was then asked had the Germans been successful. He replied without any hesitation that they had been. Asked to give a date for this success, he stated Spring 1942. The success had not been maintained owing to the capture of the Seebohm company in 1942 near ALEXANDRIA, which led to a tightening up of British signals security. No further inroad after that date is known to PW. IO then asked PW whether he was sure he was referring to TYPEX and not to War Office Cipher, which the Germans had cracked; PW replied categorically that he was referring to TYPEX. In reply to further questions he added that the breaking of TYPEX was done partly in BERLIN and partly in AFRICA; he assumed that the success was achieved cryptoanalytically and not through compromise. Had the latter been the case, he would have known, as all compromised material secured from Abwehr or other special sources was passed to him as head of In 7/VI for distribution to particular sections.

PW was told to write a detailed memo on this subject, in particular he was told to name all individuals concerned in breaking TYPEX.

3. On 31 Jul 45 IO, after 'phone conversation with Cmdr DUDLEY-SMITH, visited PW to collect memorandum. PW declared that all his statements re TYPEX in para 2 were rubbish and that the machine was unbreakable. Although he noted the astonished expressions of the visiting officers (Major Morgan and Lt Col Lewis) it only dawned on him when he returned to his room what was the significance of

HW 40/88

what he had said. IO then asked why he had been so precise in his statements about the breaking and had given dates etc. PW replied that he did not know what he was saying and that he must have been thinking of some minor procedure as double transposition or syllabic cipher. IO informed Cmdr Dudley-Smith immediately; it was agreed to postpone action in this matter until it had been exhaustively discussed.

Top Secret

6
26

D. Pickering

Herewith the
papers about
Habel which
you should have
seen long ago.
Please return
in due course.

Rudolf Smith

S.A.C. 18-4-44

Many thanks for this. Why does H
when asked about WAGNER
give a reply which describes
SEVENHECK?

H. does clearly, at time of interrogation,
very much on his guard. It is clear
that the interrogator was defeated

H.P.

6

Major Bone.

re Habel. My visit to C.S.D.I.C. on 1st March was made at the request of Capt. Cochrane, who has been visiting H. in his cell from time to time, in a purely 'off the record' manner, and generally sounding his mood. The reason was that H asked to see a Sigs. Offr., as he was fed up with 'solitary' and promised to talk in order to relieve his position.

Three possibilities arose:

(a) That H. would tell us all we wanted to know.

(b) That he hoped to satisfy us with a partial story.

(c) That he wanted to find out what we wished to learn from him, and at the same time dispose of the chance of other charges being raised.

Despite the risk of (c), I interrogated H., but with no positive success. This was, however, only intended as a preliminary, and it should be possible after collecting further information available here, seeing Haunhorst, and getting additional details from Cdr. Dudly-Smith, to do a more thorough job.

The possibility, however that H. is not as knowledgeable a person as one would expect to be in command of 621 Coy. must not be overlooked. In this connection a comparison between his career and that of Seebohm in the attached report is rather striking, and perhaps indicative.

4

Captain I.O.

4.3.44.

MOST SECRET.

Report on 1st Interrogation of Hauptmann (Captain)
HEINRICH HABEL at C.S.D.I.C., 1 Mar.1944

1. Personal History.

| | |
|---|---|
| Born | 13th Jan. 15. at WANNE-EICKEL (Ruhr) |
| Education | Volkschule (elementary) until 1929 followed by 4 years WERKSCHULE (trade school) where he trained as Machine-fitter. |
| 1/4/33 | Entered Army and trained as signaller. Served in Sigs pl. of 17 Inf. Regt. |
| 1935 - 7 | P.T. Instructor at WÜNSDORF |
| 1937 - 8 | At BIELEFELD as book-keeper with 3 Coy, 26 Sigs. Regt. |
| 1939 - 40 | Serving with this unit, where he reached rank of HAUPTWACHTMEISTER (W.O.1.). |
| 1 Jan 41 | Commissioned. |
| 1 Mar 41 | Posted to 3 Coy., 56 Sigs. Regt. with which unit he proceeded to Africa in April. |

2. Captured with remains of 621 Intercept Coy. (the named assumed by 3.(H)/N56 w.e.f 17/4/42, near GROMBALIA (Tunisia), about 11 May, 1943.

3. Personality. P/W is a polite well spoken type and although fairly intelligent, does not appear by any means a 'Y-Wizard'. He may be at present somewhat anxious to please, nevertheless it is not yet clear whether his lack of detail on some points is due to ignorance or security.

4. Service in Africa. Habel asserts that his particular function prior to the debacle near el Alamein in July 42, was as O.C. D/F pl. In this capacity he was not concerned with the cryptographic work, and professes to have been ignorant of the Coys. work in this connection.

After July 42 he was sent back to Germany, partly on compassionate grounds and partly to secure new personnel. During this period the Coy was commanded by Obit. (Lt.) Kroeplin, but when Habel returned with the new people on 3 Oct '42, he took command, and remained O.C. Coy. until May '43.

He asserts that the Coy strength at the end of the Tunisian campaign was about 170 men (Establishment - 332 all ranks. Strength 22 May 1942 (cap doc) - 296 all ranks)

5. Coy Tasks According to P/W this consisted in:

(a) D/F'ing c/s of British units and formations to establish Order of Battle and movements . They had recorded our c/s and traced the changes, and H. stated that he believed it was in connection with c/s that he had been brought over.

(b) Recording traffic in clear. British units, he asserted, used a vast amount of P/L, even up to the end of the Tunisian campaign.

(c) No codes or ciphers, he asserted were broken by cryptographic means, and he expressed the view that such a thing is impossible on both sides. They only read our codes when they were able to capture the keys, and according to H. at no time were any machines or high grade material obtained. Far from hoping to crack codes, he says his I C (I.O. at higher Formn.) 'jumped 3 feet off the ground in excitement when he brought him any P/L.'

6. History after El Alamein.

The Coy. lost most of its use to the Africa force after Alamein, being depleted in numbers and never able to settle in one place long enough to get continuity. Some improvement was possible from the time of MARETH, but even so P/W described the whole episode as disappointing.

7. On individual points P/W gave the following answers:

(a) Wagner. The only man of this name he remembers was a driver (correct from cap. docs.)

(b) Seebohm. Here P/W gave a similar picture to what we had previously had - an outstanding 'Y' Officer who carried the Coy. on his shoulders, but kept the main matters rather to himself. As a result they felt his loss very badly and P/W thinks we don't realize what a difference it made (a brief record of Seebohm's career, from cap. docs., is given at the end for comparison with that of Habel).

(c) Oberst Mügge. Horchkommander Süd (in Rome). The Coy. came under him for 'Y' matters. Had once visited them in Tunisia dnd described as 'a nice chap.'

(d) Oberst Kahn. Armee Nafü (C.S.O. at Army) at Heeresgruppe Afrika. 621 Coy. came under him for ordinary matters. H.

did not got to know him well in Africa, but did later as he was P/W Commandant of the Camp in USA where H. was. Described also as a good type.

(e) Oblt. Bremer. H. insists that Bremer was a quite normal Sigs. Offr. who was sent to fill a vacancy and who after finding his feet, would have commanded a pl. of the Coy.

(f) Evacuation. No particular instructions were received for personnel of the Coy. to be sent home. The matter was not pursued at this stage.

(g) Personnel. H. himself does not speak English. He said the English speaking personnel of the Coy. were mostly young "Abiturienten" (people who have passed Intermediate) whose knowledge was still fresh in their minds.

(A further report will follow after a later interrogation.)

Captain I.O.
M.I.8.a.

5.3.44.

Career of Hauptmann Seebohm

(from cap. docs.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Born | 4 June 1914 at KASSEL. |
| 1925 | at GYMNASIUM in KASSEL. (= approx. public day school). |
| 4/6/34 | completed course in electricity at TECHNISCHE HOCHSCHULE (Technical College) at BRUNSWICK. In SA as signaller and did his ARBEITSDIENST. |
| 1/10/34 | Joined Army. Signaller in 9 Sigs. Regt. |
| 30/9/36 | entered KREIGSCHULE (Mil. Acad.) at MUNICH as CADET. |
| 1/4/37 | Gazetted 2/Lt. in N6, thence went to 3 Coy/N26 at BIELEFELD. |
| 1/8/39 | Promoted Lt. |

27 6

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL

DS/324

18th March 1944.

Dear Hart,

Reference our conversation of 17th March, I enclose for your very personal information a document (T/A.16) describing the reasons for the recent changes in Typex procedure. This report is a very "inflammable" one and I must insist that no extract or summary of it be issued or shown to your people without reference back to me or to my masters.

I am taking up the general question of issuing such a document to all the members of the C.S.C. but this may take some time.

I would be very pleased to discuss points in the paper with you in Town if you should want to.

Yours sincerely,

H.W. Hart, Esq.,
Dominions Office.

MOST SECRET DS/507

3rd March, 1944.

Dear Bono,

Thank you for your letter MI8/A/42/5 of 24th February 1944, regarding SWENHECK, the documents are returned herewith.

I hope the information passed to you yesterday over the 'phone was what you wanted. A more detailed written report will be forthcoming in a day or so.

Yours sincerely,

for R. D-S.
(M.I.6)

Major S.V. Bono,
M.I.8.,
War Office.

Tel. No.—Whitehall 9400.

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to :—

The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office,
London, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted.

M.I.8/A/42/5

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

24th February, 1944.

MOST SECRET

Memorandum for:-

Lt.-Commander Dudley Smith R.N.

---

Herewith a copy of a report drawn up by Captain Lawrance who has been carrying out the interrogation of SEVENHECK.

Whilst I am of opinion that Captain Lawrance's conclusions are well founded and C.S.D.I.C. are of the same opinion, I should be glad to have your comments and any suggestions as to the next step we should take.

Would you please return the attached documents (see para. 2) which are only on loan.

S.W.Bore.
Major, G.S.

COPY

MOST SECRET

21 Feb 44 - 1130 to 1200 hrs.

Report of 8Y on SEVENHECK

S has already given all his personal details in another camp.
He is a Bauer who has lived all his life in very poor circumstances.
Before he was called up to the GA he had never visited a Grossstadt.
He is not a Nazi and has never been in the H.J.
Typical of the life and conditions in his Bauerndorf is the fact that his mother had never seen a railway train.
With the exception of Landwirtschaft he is an utter ignoramus. He learnt nothing at the Volksschule (he does not even know his multiplication tables) and has not taken the Mittlere Reife.
He has not been home for two years, and worries a great deal about his wife, to whom he has not written for several months.

He says that he knows absolutely nothing about Funk work, coding etc.
His duties comprised the transport of water and Verpflegungwagen, and latterly he had been in charge of a Senderwagen (nur Militärisch befohlen).
He does not know what an Umformer is or even what a Watt is.

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| MILITARY HISTORY | 1939 | Called up for military service and sent to a Fernaufkl Kp |
| | May/Jun 42 | Uffz |
| | 11 May 43 | Captured in TUNIS. Some of his Kp were sent back to GERMANY before the fall of TUNIS. He was supposed to be going on leave but could not get away. |
| | 8 May 43 | Promoted Fw by his CO, who saw that the situation was hopeless and promoted him out of kindness of heart so that he should benefit from the better pay of a Fw. |

---

8Y is convinced that S is an uneducated, ignorant Bauer, that he could not possibly have had any connection with Funk work, codes etc. He bases his opinion on his conversations with S and on the latter's speech, bearing and manners. Living in such close contact with S, the latter must have betrayed himself in some way or another if his story were not correct.

COPY MOST SECRET

Major Bone.
M.I.8/A/42/5.

re: Feldwebel/Sgt. SEVENHECK. AUGUST

NFAK 621 (621 Intercept Coy.)

born: 5.9.13.
entered army: 1.10.36 (few months service only).
recalled from reserve: Aug. 39.
civilian occupation: farmer
home town: DINSLAKEN (small). (Westphalia).
Promoted Obergefreiter (L/Cpl.): 1.11.40.
- " - Unteroffizier (Cpl.): mid 42.
- " - Feldwebel (Sgt.): 9th May, 1943.

---

I am setting down hereafter what I consider the salient points arising from my visits to C.S.D.I.C. :-

1) The previous tactics having failed, the help of an SP known as 8Y was enlisted. This man is extremely capable and trustworthy, and furthermore came from the German Naval Y Service, and so knew exactly what he was about. He was briefed appropriately.

2) Attached hereto are:
(a) a statement dictated by S. to an earleir companion.
(b) 8Y's report on S.
(c) Various items of S.R. (all of these are only on loan to us and have to be returned).

3) All these documents confirm 8Y's opinion that S. is only a simple fellow. In a verbal report he subsequently asserted that he would have been able to see at once if S. had been the 'type' for a genuine 'Y' man, but his inability to discuss even non-service matters with any intelligence, his lack of education and breeding, ignorance of any foreign languages, and the difficulty with which he wrote even a simple card home, convinced him of the opposite. He asserted that a Y man would have had at least to have reached his 'mittlere Reife' whereas S. had only been to Volkschule.

That S. should simulate 'dumbness' for 8 weeks and never give himself away even when talking of non-duty matters, even on a single occasion, is to say the least, doubtful.

4) 8Y also told S. that he had been an idiot to maintain such solid silence over what he had been doing, and told me that S. saw this now and regretted it. I, therefore, decided to see S. again.

5) S. proved much more amenable to reason and answered freely, with details of his unit, officers etc., but could give no information on anything new to us. He had once by chance seen a cipher machine - 'a box with a keyboard like a typewriter' - knew nothing of W/T operating or receiving, and a 'Funkskizze' (shown) was to him a 'Leitungskizze' for the telephone. He asserted that the 'Kurierpost' which his squad dealt with came to him in envelopes and he was only responsible for having the cars ready to take them.

6) Certain details did, however, come out, which make possible a hazard at the reason for S' name becoming connected with the matter.

He went to Africa with the first German tps. in 1941, with a small unit 'Nachrichtenstaffel Afrika' and only subsequently joined NFAK 621 (then 3(H)./N56), this unit only arriving at Tunisia on 24 Apr. 41. He does not know why he was sent to 3(H)./N56 (unless someone wanted to dump him !) as the only sigs. training he had ever had was in line laying and telephone operating. At any rate he was almost certainly in Africa longer than

.....

anyone else in the Coy., and owing to the captures at El Alamein and large scale replacements thereafter, it is probable that when in April '43 an order directed that all who had done 2 years in Africa should be sent home, S., was the only man who qualified. It appears then that the C.O. wanted to help S., for in addition he had a child he had never seen, and so as things looked black he applied for permission for S. to fly home, to get him out in time. It may therefore well be that the mention of S. in a message from Rome was no more than a permission for him to fly. The fact is that he went to the A/F, but no plane came, and so he was disappointed. As consolation the C.O. decided that Cpl. Sevenheck should become Sgt. Sevenheck.

7) If this view is not acceptable, and B.P. have additional evidence to show S. as being a man of some importance in his unit, a new effort will be made, although at present I have no idea what new approach is possible.

8) Re Hauptman/Capt. Habel and Oblt. Bremer, could B.P. please be asked for as much evidence as possible, particularly re the latter.

(Sg.) L. Lawrance.

24.2.44.

Captain, I.O.
M.I.8. A.

A 10.

Col Tidman

Cdr. Trollope

Five months of
interrogation has produced
no additional information
on German exploitation
of Typex in N. Africa.

SAC.

3.6.44

Tel. No.—Whitehall 9400.

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to :—

The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office,
London, S.W.1,
and the following number quoted.

M.I.8/A/42/5

THE WAR OFFICE,
LONDON, S.W.1.

1st June, 1944

SECRET

Memorandum for:-

Lieut.Commander Dudley-Smith, R.N.
G.C.H.Q.

1-- Attached herewith a copy of a minute addressed to D.D.M.I.(PW) regarding HABEL and BREMER together with our remarks drawn up for your information.

In view of the unsuccessful attempts to obtain information from these two Ps.o.W. I am of opinion that there is very little further we can do.

You will note that as far as possible the necessary precautions to safeguard our interests have been taken regarding the disposal of these men.

L.V.Bong
Major, G.S.

2 copies.

SECRET.

Return of Traffic from ----------Y Station for 24 hrs ending midnight

TOP SECRET

INTERROGATION OF L.W. HABEL AND BREMER.

These two P.o.W. who were brought over from U.S.A. on 26 Dec. '43 have now been interrogated for 5 months without obtaining any definite information from them. They are extremely security minded, and, in the case of Bremer, extremely clever and fully aware of all the "tricks of the trade". The majority of the time of their detention in this country has been spent in solitary confinement during which they were subjected to a number of direct interrogations as well as several "schemes". As a result of this work only one inconclusive piece of evidence was obtained from one of them - HABEL - who indicated by indirect reference that the unit concerned with high Grade Cryptography in Africa may not have been identical with 621 NFA, but a special "unit" under the direct control of Rome or Berlin. This information would appear to tally on general lines with the information obtained from HAUNHORST concerning the activities of the "WAGNER" section, which may be identical with the "DIENSTSTELLE VON [illegible] (HERR OR [illegible])."

At the last interview with BREMER a certain measure of success was obtained in that he was finally persuaded to admit that his story of his military career, as recounted to interrogator was an invention. Beyond this admission, no further information was obtained. P.W. stated that he would refuse to answer any further questions on military matters and if such were put to him he would refuse to speak on any subject whatever. This last interview finished on a very friendly basis but all attempts at indirect reference to locations and work resulted in a repetition of the above-mentioned statement.

Unfortunately this whole interrogation has been prejudiced in favour of Ps. o. W. as in addition to having 6 months time in U.S.A. to consider their position they travelled over in company and undoubtedly fixed a story between them. In view of the protracted nature of the interrogation in this country and the utter failure to break down their security by any means permissible under the Geneva Convention, there seems to be no further benefit to be derived from keeping them under such extremely hard mental and physical conditions; as it is they could make well supported representations to the Red Cross regarding their unconventional treatment.

/Arrangements

. . . Arrangements have been made that their mail shall receive special investigation for possible coded messages, and they are to be placed in different Camps.

. Care was taken throughout the interrogations not to give them any cause for suspicion regarding the sources of our information concerning their work. This was greatly helped by the fact that they are fully aware of the compromising information we may have obtained from co-belligerent Italian Officers working under Ldr. d.H. Tr. in Rome. Where necessary, we have been careful to indicate that this was in fact the source of our information.

Capt., G.S.

M.I.8.(a)
1.6.44.

D.D.M.I.(M.I.)

P.o.W. HAHNE and BREMER have now been interrogated both by C.S.D.I.(UK) and by officers of M.I.8, and, although every means possible were used to induce these two men to talk, their inherent security which is of an abnormally high standard has completely defeated normal methods of approach.

In view of this, I think that there is no point in retaining these P. o. W. any further. Could the necessary arrangements, therefore, be made for their disposal to separate camps, travelling separately. In order to safeguard our interests, I think it would be advisable to subject their mail to special scrutiny, as there is, I think, a strong possibility, in view of previous experience with P.o.W. [illegible], that one or both of these men may attempt to inform Berlin of details of their interrogation.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you for your very kind co-operation and this rather disappointing matter and apologise for the trouble the whole interrogation must have caused you.

Lt.-Colonel, G.S.

M.I.8.(a).
Ext. 1594.
31st May, 1944.

MOST SECRET

DS/229

11th January, 1944.

Dear Colonel Vernham,

I attach a copy of a letter from Johnston to Bull regarding the North African typex affair. I don't know whether a preliminary report will appear soon regarding the four men from America but presumably Heller, or whoever is concerned, should have the attached for guidance on the Air Force aspects of the case.

Yours sincerely,

Lieut. Colonel J.R. Vernham,
M.I.8,
War Office.

COPY

KJ/I

MOST SECRET

Air Ministry,
King Charles Street,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

1st January, 1944.

Dear Bull,

In accordance with the decision of the last Meeting of the Cypher Security Committee, I enclose a few observations on any interrogation which may be carried out as the result of the information obtained from Lieut. Haunhorst.

On looking through the report I agree very much with your view that we cannot in any way direct how information is to be obtained and can do nothing more than make a few general suggestions. In fact, it may be that we shall not be of real assistance until a preliminary interrogation has been carried out.

However, here are a few points:-

(i) The most important thing is details of the books referred to in paragraph 4 of the first interrogation, particularly those which do not appear to have been captured documents.

(ii) The identify of the attractive brown polished boxes referred to in 1(c) of the inserts to the G.C. & C.S. questionnaire. The dimensions are slightly too large for an insert box and slightly too small for a drum box. It is probably the latter. Nowhere is it stated what was in the boxes.

(iii) Further information is desirable about the intended air attacks which were supposed to have been known. Paragraph 6 on the first interrogation refers.

(iv) It should be confirmed that no Air Force traffic was read.

(v) The number of drums concerned is an obviously important point.

The War Office might also be asked if they have any explanation as to why mostly 8th Army traffic was concerned. Paragraph 7 of the answer to the questionnaire refers.

Yours

Commander Bull,
War Cabinet Offices.

LOST LUGGAGE.

3rd January, 1944.

Dear Dudley Smith,

... Herewith copy of an unsigned letter dated 1st January which I received from the Air Ministry.

I have not seen the Report referred to but I am assuming that you are the proper recipient of our observations thereon made in accordance with what was agreed at the last C.S.C. Meeting.

Yours sincerely,
for George Bull.
Commander, R.N.V.R.

[illegible]

[illegible]
c/o Room 17,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

Most Secret

Tel. No. ABBEY 3411.

EXT.....

AIR MINISTRY,

KING CHARLES STREET,

WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

K.3/I

1st January, 1941.

Dear Bull

In accordance with the decision of the last meeting of the Cypher Security Committee, I enclose a few observations on any interrogation which may be carried out as the result of the information obtained from Lt. Haunhorst.

On looking through the report I agree very much with your view that we cannot in any way direct how information is to be obtained and can do nothing more than make a few general suggestions. In fact, it may be that we shall not be of real assistance until a preliminary interrogation has been carried out.

However, here are a few points:-

(i) The most important thing is details of the books referred to in Para. 4 of the first information, especially those which do not appear to have been captured documents.

(ii) The identity of the attractive brown polished boxes referred to in 1(c) of the Secrets to the C.-in-C. Coastal Area. The dimensions are probably too large for an insert and probably too small for a code box. It is probably the latter. Perhaps it is stated what was in the boxes.

(iii) Further information is desirable about the intended objectives which were supposed to have been taken. Par. 6 of the first interrogation refers.

(iv) It should be confirmed that no Air Force traffic was sent.

(v) The number of days coloured is obviously important.

Yours ever Bill,

[illegible]

The Air Officer might also be asked if they have any explanation as to why mostly 8th Army traffic was concerned. Para. 7 of the ~~answers~~ answer to the questionnaire refers.

Yours

A820

**The War Office,**

Whitehall,

S.W.1.

WHI 9400
Ext 475

Your reference.....
1082/Sigs 6(b)

MOST SECRET

Pay.Lt.Comd. R. Dudley Smith,
GC and CS.

Attached is copy of telegram from C-in-C, Middle East I/44472 with further reference to the enquiry relating to the possible loss of cipher equipment at Tobruk.

Signals 6.
10 Dec 43.

Major, GS.

MOST SECRET
CIPHER TELEGRAM

This Message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted even in cipher without being paraphrased.

390768.

From: C.-in-C. Middle East. Recd. 1540 7 Dec. '43.

To: The War Office.

I/44472 cipher 7 Dec. MOST SECRET.

Personal for Vale from Hume.

Your 88712 (Sigs 6) of 13 Nov. and our I 38167 of 21 Nov.

Navy report no typex equipment held by RN ships or staffs using Tobruk. RAF report no machines or drums held RAF in Tobruk relevant dates. They add all drums held RAF during retreat to Alamein safely returned.

T.O.O. Nil.

C.6. Telegrams.

To: Sigs.6 (for action)

Copies to: D.D. M.I.(O)
D.D. 'Y'
M.I.8.17.
Sigs.6(5)
Admlty (War Org.)
A.H.C.S.(Air Liais ry

MOST SECRET
CIPHER TELEGRAM

586201

**This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).**

From :- C.-in-C. Middle East.

To :- The War Office. Recd. 1245 22 Nov 43.

I/38167 cipher 21 Nov. MOST SECRET.

Most Secret and Personal Vale from Hume.

Your 88712 (Sigs.6) of 13 Nov.

Your paras one two three answer No.

Your four not applicable.

Your five one set black drums Number 1270 handed over on authority CSO 8 Army to Captain MacFarlane Cipher Officer 2 SA Division reported by latter destroyed night before Tobruk file reference 8 Army X2/883 of 20 June 42. Destruction certificate black drums 1270 based on this cipher message which stated all cipher equipment except one 'W' Book one local recyphering table destroyed.

Your six one Typex machine with convertor batteries locally produced message settings and drum settings possibly also one copy BX 424/1.

Your seven No documents retrieved. Above information from Major North CCO 13 Corps above date and Captain Duckworth on CSO Staff 8 Army. Former speaks highly of reliability MacFarlane. Report other services follows. T.O.O. Nil.

Distributed by Sigs. 3.

C.6.(Tels). Copies to:- D.D.M.I.(C).
A.D.S.I.
M.I.6.
Sigs. 3. (5 copies)

The War Office,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

Whitehall 9400
Extension 475

Fay. Capt. D.A. Wilson,

W/Cond. K. Johnston.

Pay. Lt. Cond. Dudley Smith, R.N.

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You may be interested to see the questionnaire we sent to Middle East concerning the loss of cipher material at Tobruk.

Signals 6.
16 Nov 43.

MOST SECRET
CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted, even in cipher, without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

OIL THIS P.D.

From: The War Office Dcsp. 1545 13 Nov.43.

To: GHQ, Middle East.

....M.712..... Sigs 6 cipher 13 Nov.

REPEAT

MOST SECRET. OFFICE OHL. Personal for [illegible] from [illegible].

FW has made statements suggesting type K equipment captured [illegible] June 42. You will appreciate necessity for urgent and exhaustive investigation this point. Can you provide information following points.

1. Were any black drums other than No. 1270 held in [illegible].

2. Destruction certificate for above set held. Do you know how they were destroyed.

3. Were red drums held.

4. If so were they got away before any possibility of inspection by [illegible].

5. Were any drums left behind either buried dismantled buried or disposed of any other way.

6. Were type K [illegible] such as [illegible] setting drum setting instruction manuals were held there.

7. Were any such [illegible] captured in [illegible] if so how were they disposed of.

8. Suggest what the Services should be advised to [illegible].

C.f. Telegrams.

1 0 0 131230

Copies to: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Sigs 6 (2 copies)

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL DS/169.

9th November, 1943.

Dear Williams,

I enclose copies of correspondence regarding the "Haunhorst - Wagner" typex story which have now been sent to Admiralty and Air Ministry.

Yours sincerely,

J.H. Williams Esq.,
Sigs 6,
War Office.

MOST SECRET & Personal. DS/-168.

Paymaster Captain D.A. Wilson, R.N., Admiralty.

Wing Commander K.R.H. Johnston, Air Ministry.

The interrogation of a P.O.W. brought home from Tunisia has brought to light evidence that during the Tunisian Campaign the German Army 'Y' Service were able to exploit in the field a certain amount of British Army type traffic.

Although it seems unquestionable that their success was largely due to the capture of machines and keys at Tebruk, it is not at all clear to what extent, if at all, Berlin supplied them with new settings, etc., obtained cryptographically, and whether they succeeded in obtaining a copy of new machine settings by physical means in Tunisia.

The P.O.W. in question, Leutnant HAUNHORST, a Divisional Intelligence Officer who was friendly with the officers of the "Y" Unit NFAK. 621, and who received their reports, has been interrogated three times (once by Ooser and Pickering from G.C.C.S.) but as a non-expert he cannot enlighten us on the technical points regarding the use of the captured machines which it is most important to determine at the earliest possible moment.

Nearly all the personnel of the actual "Y" Unit (Nachrichten Fern Aufklarungs Kompanie 621) were captured in Tunisia in mid-May 1943, but owing to the difficulties at the time were not segregated, were able to destroy their identification papers, and became "lost" in the general mass of captured German personnel, and are now in America.

Arrangements have now been made for the four members of the Company who should be able to throw most light on this problem, to be assembled at C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) within a few weeks.

Copies of the following relevant documents are enclosed herewith:-

(a) First Interrogation of Lt. HAUNHORST and Oberlt. POSSEL.

(b) Second Interrogation (Questionnaire prepared by G.C. & C.S.)

(c) Minutes of meeting held at G.C. & C.S. on 16th September 1943.

(d) Extracts from Final Interrogation of HAUNHORST.

(e) Signals exchanged with Washington regarding other P.O.W's.

7th November, 1943.

MOST SECRET
OPTIC IN C.IN

Copy No. 3

# First Interrogation report on two German Army Officers captured in Tunisia.

(Carried out by M.I.8.(a) with the co-operation and facilities of C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.)).

This report if MOST SECRET and should not be passed beyond the listed distribution without previous reference to M.I.8.

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## INSECURITY OF BRITISH CIPHERS

### 1. PERSONALIA

(a) HAUPHORST Hanswolf Leutnant. b.19.3.21.
Staff 334 Inf. Div.
This officer was Div. Intelligence Officer specialising in enemy Artillery Intelligence. He is an anti-Nazi by conviction and is prepared to be co-operative as he possibly can. During his service in Africa he became very friendly with the officers of 621 Interception Coy. and has a good working knowledge of the organisation and work of the Coy. He was himself, on the distribution of the "B.J's" and periodical Wireless Intelligence reports issued by the Coy. and took particular interest in the methods by which the information contained in the B.J's was obtained.

(b) POSSEL Werner, Oberleutnant b.22.2.18.
10 Pz. A.O.K. Nachr. Regt. Funkstellenfuhrer.
Possel was O.C. of the senior fixed Army Wireless station in Africa, HeFu 7, and as such controlled all other HeFy's in Africa. For a time he was Funksachbearbeiter with the staff of H.Gr Africa. He was friendly with the officers of 621 Intercept Coy. and had the handling of much of their wireless traffic.

The facts cited in this report were obtained for the most part from Hauptorst, and confirmed independently by Possel. No attempt was made during the Interrogation to pursue any of the statements made as it was considered undesirable at this juncture to risk putting ideas into the P.o.W's heads, and it was decided to wait until the facts could be checked and any specific points followed up.

### 2. HAND CIPHERS

A new Hand Cipher introduced for the Tunisian campaign was broken and read continuously by the Coy. By the description given of the traffic read, this particular cipher appears to have been in general use below divisional level. Several examples of this cipher were captured and from the description given by P.o.W. would appear to be the "JOSHUA". The American "Hagelin" cipher was regularly read with the air of captured machines.

3/

3. HIGH-GRADE CIPHERS

P.o.W. stated that priority was given to the interception of all Army High-Grade traffic. This traffic was treated cryptographically by the Coy. with considerable success. All traffic from A.F.H.Q. to the three Armies was read regularly, and as a result, details were known of every Allied attack. In addition, the composition, dates of arrival and loading of all convoys reaching North Africa were known several days in advance and speculation was rife concerning the date of the first appearance of new units or equipment mentioned in this traffic. The information was issued in the form of B.J's which, however, gave no indication whatever of the source; thus it was impossible to tell whether it was plain language, lowgrade hand cipher or High-grade traffic. For the most part, the messages were of a long term strategical staff nature, dealing with both operations and supplies.

4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS EMPLOYED.

All high grade traffic was handled by a certain Warra t Officer WAGNER. This man has at his disposal one or more British Type-X machines captured at Tobruch, a machine resembling a German Enigma machine, and a special type of typewriter which had an adjustable keyboard. In addition a number of reference books were employed from which the Type-X settings were taken. The procedure appears to have been as follows:

> The message was examined and the "Kenngruppe" (Discriminant) looked up in a book. This gave a reference to another reference book where the actual setting of the machine was found. The machine (Type-X) was then set and the message decoded.

In certain cases this procedure did not work, and in this case, certain information was sent to O.K.H. Berlin who were able to supply the necessary information for the deciphering of the traffic.

The documents used appear to have been of two varieties - Captured British Cipher documents giving message settings and machine settings, which the interrogater has not yet been able to identify, and documents compiled by the "Haupt Chiffrier Stelle OKH", which appear to be reconstructions of message settings and drum settings based on a detailed analysis of high grade traffic during the past 3-4 years. From these documents it would appear to be possible, once the message setting has been deciphered to determine the drum settings and tyre positions by reference to the previous occurrence of the message setting.

All High-Grade traffic is passed to Berlin for detailed examination, and such traffic as cannot be read by any of the above means appears to be subjected to an analysing machine which, providing some evidence regarding the traffic is available, giving results in many cases.

5. DISTRIBUTION OF B.J.s.

Information from cryptographic sources is, as has already been mentioned, passed without any kind of identification, to the Intelligence Office of the senior formation where it is evaluated and distributed to all interested parties. No such information may be passed to Berlin by ordinary wireless channels; the normal route is by courier, although in exceptional cases such information may be passed by encoded wireless teleprinter.

6. EVENTUAL WIDENING OF GERMAN SUCCESS WITH BRITISH HIGH-GRADE CIPHERS.

During the course of an interrogation of Lt. BODE carried out at C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.) in June, 1943, this I.o.W. gave certain information regarding the work of a certain Sgt. [illegible] of 621 Intercept Coy. This information implied that Sgt. [illegible] was operating a Type-X machine and deciphering British High grade traffic. Little credence was given to this account at the time owing to the unreliability of Lt. Bode. However, owing to this information being now confirmed by two independent witnesses, Lt. Bode's sotry appears to be materially correct and adds further confirmation to the accounts given by Lt. Haunhorts and Oberlt. Possel. In addition to the now confirmed statement of Lt. Bode, there have been, during the past month several references to reading British High-Grade ciphers in Berlin; notable among these is a statement by Oberleut. Saul, Flivo Tunis, that information concerning intended air attacks and Air Force operations was sent to Tunis by Berlin under "Most Secret" cover. This information appears to have been of a nature which would not be passed in other than High-Grade cipher.

7. CONCLUSION.

From the evidence supplied by the above mentioned P.o.W it would seem that the German Interception Service is capable of reading certain of our High Grade ciphers by means of captured settings, documents and captured Cipher machines, found at Tobruch, as well as by means of analysis of High-Grade traffic and subsequent reconstruction of settings by cryptographic methods. By no means all settings were read, as for example, there is no evidence to believe that any of the special "Y" service settings were known to the Germans. No effort has yet been made to identify the documents used by the Intercept Coy. in Africa, nor have any of the leads given by the interrogation been followed up as yet. Future and more detailed interrogations may yield some more definite information.

M.I.6.(c)
3rd August, 1943.

Captain G.S.

ANSWERS TO THE G.C. & C.S. QUESTIONNAIRE

1) What did Wagner's Type X machines look like? Obtain as full a description as possible to ensure Type X and not American Ciphering machines involved.

Three different types of machines were in use in the decoding section-

a) What appeared to be the large German Enigma Machine, i.e. the automatic machine as opposed to the usual small manual field type.

b) An American machine, dimensions, 25 cm. by 35 cm. by 15 cm. No details are available concerning this machine.

c) Two English machines having the following description:- Central typewriter keyboard flanked on either side by two complicated, hollow pots, having the appearance of the outside housing of a small electric generator. A paper strip was fed out from the inside of the two pots. The lefthand one appeared to be the one mostly in use. At the back of the keyboard was the main mechanism of the machine. P.o.W. only once saw the inside of this "box", which he said contained 5 drums. In addition to the machine itself there were several very attractive brown polished boxes about 15 cm. long and with square section of about 5 - 8 cm.

2) Where were the Type X documents captured?

3) Have the P.o.W. seen the captured documents themselves? What did they look like? Colour, size, thickness and lay-out.

P.o.W. has virtually no knowledge of the documents used by the decoding section when working with the English machines. They were kept in a separate room under lock and key and only a very limited number of people were ever allowed to see them and then only in connection with their work. Apart from the fact that they were books of English origin as well as German prepared documents P.o.W. has no information on this subject.

4) What did the catalogues prepared by Berlin look like? How were the ones set out which determined drum fittings and tyre positions? Were they in manuscript, typed or printed?

The Documents prepared by Berlin were foolscap sheets covered with typing. Each sheet had a complicated reference number at the top and they were all kept in a large indexed folder. The "Kenngruppe" of the message was looked up in several "Books" and after a rather complicated system of cross reference, one typescript sheet was selected and given to the operator. The latter took this sheet and with its aid, "fiddled" about with the machine and then began to decipher the message. The contents of the typescript were incomprehensible to P.o.W. and appeared to consist of a mass of letters and figures.

These typescript documents arrive by courier from O.B.3. Rome who in turn received it from Berlin. They do not appear to arrive regularly, but at intervals and in packets of several sheets. Very considerable security measures are taken to assure the secrecy of the document.

5) Were the messages usually complete, or did the more secret ones consist of a first or middle or last portion? If the latter, what was the length of such portion?

Most of the messages were complete, but a number of the more secret and important ones appeared to have gaps. P.o.W.

/inquired...

inquired about this and was informed that often a cipher message would contain one or more parts which appeared to be short messages and although they appeared to be in the same cipher setting, could in fact not be deciphered. These inserted parts caused the deciphering section a very great deal of trouble and they could find no explanation for them. P.o.W. could not remember whether these "inserts" were ever specifically the beginning, middle or end part of the message.

6) How often did the drums have to be removed from the machine and altered?

No information available from present P.o.Ws.

7) What were the most common Allied addresses in the more secret B.Js.? Did American authorities appear frequently in the addresses?

The bulk of the traffic was either addressed to or signed by 8th Army. The traffic was almost entirely concerning the "G" branches of A.F.H.Q., 8th Army and the Corps subordinate to 8th Army. The links were those between 8th Army and A.F.H.Q. and 8th Army and subordinate Formations. This traffic accounted for 80% of the B.J. material.

The remainder was for the most part "Q" traffic of the American 7th Army and A.F.H.Q. Very little traffic of the 1st Army was read. Unfortunately P.o.W. cannot recall any verbatim addresses, and in any case, these had been translated into German equivalent, i.e. I (a), O (qu), I(b), etc.

8) What sort of addresses did the messages giving convoy movements have?

All traffic dealing with convoy movements and ship arrivals was orginated by A.F.H.Q. and addressed to the three Armies. The German Address and Signature read approximately as follows: "An O.Qu 7 Am. A.O.K. von O.Qu. Alliertes Haupt Quartier. In BONE eingelaufen 3 Schiffe. 160 Tonnen Muni. f. 75 mm, etc. etc." The ship movements seem to have been largely confined to coastal convoys. Only on very few occasions did any mention appear of Ocean convoys' expected time of arrival and composition.

9) Give as much detail as possible of one or two particular messages of a secret nature - messages P.o.W. would remember because their contents were especially valuable or startling or amusing.

P.o.W. cannot remember the exact text of any particular message but gives the following 3 messages which he remembers particularly well owing to their great importance and interest -

a) An exceptionally long message was received some time in March 1943. The message consisted of an intelligence summary issued by G.S.I. 8th Army and dealt largely with the re-organisation of the German O. of B. at the time when the D.A.K. took over the Mareth Line positions. The full text, in which there were a number of gaps (see para 5) occupied three and a half pages of typescript. The message commenced with the words "Neue Feindlage. Feind hat ... etc."

b) Beginning of February, a very interesting report from subordinate formations to B.M.I., 1st Army, giving the complete Order of Battle of the 1st Army with special reference to Artillery support, in the Gubellat - Djebel Tanzur area.

/ c)....

c) Date not known. A message from 8th Army stating that the 4th Armd. Div. will move to the area Beja - Medjes el Bab on "such and such" a date.

10) What were the average time lags between interception (or T.O.O. of high grade messages and promulgation of the B.Js.?

11) What was the shortest time lag?

The average time lag between T.O.I. and receipt of the B.Js. (approx. 3-4 hours after issue) was 12-24 hours. The delay was never more than 36 hours. The shortest time lag that P.o.W. can remember is in the case of para 9c above where the information was received some 6 hours after the time of interception.

12) How often were the B.Js. sent to Berlin by wireless Teleprinter?

B.Js. were hardly ever sent to Berlin by Wireless T.P. P.o.W. has only heard of two instances. As a general rule they went by courier every day. The Intercept.Coy. NEVER sent any themselves; this was the duty of I(c) at Heeresgruppe.

13) Might it be possible that N.F.A.K.621 used a code word on the B.Js. to indicate those obtained from high grade ciphers?

P.o.W. does not know of any special code word or sign used to denote High grade B.Js., though he does remember that the B.Js. had a number of reference numbers which were never explained.

14) When did the Company have their first success with reading high grade traffic?

Some high grade succes was obtained early in 1941, but this was sporadic. The first occasion is not known to P.o.W., but he has heard from the O.C. of the Coy. that High Grade traffic was being read from the first days of the war.

15) When did they get into their stride?

It was only after the capture of Tobruk that the Coy. started to produce High Grade B.Js. on any scale. It was at Tobruk that the two British machines together with documents were captured.

16) Could Berlin supply Wagner with the necessary information for deciphering in most cases when he could not get the messages out himself?

No very conclusive evidence was obtainable on this point. It would appear that Berlin was in a position to supply information in cases where 621 N.F.A. were unable to break on their own resources, but the habit of applying to Berlin was apparently discouraged.

17) How long did it take to get the information from Berlin?

On one occasion information was supplied within 20 minutes but this was very exceptional. No other information on this point was available.

18) How many high grade 5-letter messages were intercepted daily by N.F.A.K.621?

Not known.

/19.....

19) What were the main frequencies on which interception was carried out?

Not known.

20) Was N.F.A.K. 621 fed high grade intercepts from other sources.

No, but I(c) received summaried B.Js. from Berlin for incorporating in their intelligence summaries.

21) Was similar decoding of high grade done in Sicily or Italy?

Not to P.o.W's knowledge. There is however an office in MEDMS which is reading British high grade ciphers.

22) Did senior officers often visit the Company and show interest in Wagner's work?

All the senior staff officers who read the B.Js. wanted to visit the Coy. but it was almost impossible to obtain permission, and when permission had been obtained, it was equally difficult to find the actual location of the deciphering office. Very few officers actually succeeded in visiting the deciphering office, with the exception of the Commanding Generals and the various officers of I(c).

23) What were the locations of N.A.F.K. 621 during the time that Wagner was reading Type X? How near to the front line were they?

The section which was concerned with the breaking of British ciphers was always located with the H.Q. of the senior German formation, i.e. Heeresgruppe Afrika, (previously Pz. A.A.).

24) What is known of Wagner's previous history before he joined the Company? What was he in private life?

The identity of Wachtmeister WAGNER is a complete mystery. He is not known by that name to any of the members of the Coy., yet, whenever an outsider rang up the deciphering office, Wagner always answered. It would appear, from exhaustive inquiries, that the name WAGNER is probably a cover name. Everyreffort is being made to identify this gentleman.

1st September, 1943.

MOST SECRET

TYPEX SECURITY

Minutes of a meeting held at C.C. & C.S. on Thursday 16th September, 1943, to discuss the report of the second interrogation of [redacted] and [redacted].

Present:-

Colonel J.H. Tiltman (Chairman)
Lt.Col. J.P. Vernham, M.I.8.
Wing Comdr. Oeser
Lt. Comdr. Dudley Smith
Major Gadd
Mr. Welchman
Dr. Pickering

1. Colonel Vernham stated that it had been reported to the War Office that the drums, machine settings and message setting book at Tobruk had all been destroyed. Even if this should prove not to have been the case, however, new army machine and message settings were used in the Tunisian campaign and the only typex document held at Tobruk which continued in force was the Inter-Service Message Setting Book. The convoy movement signals referred to by the P.O.W's might quite possibly have been sent in Inter Service settings.

2. Mr. Welchman outlined a possible method of attack with captured drums, message setting book and old machine setting keys. A considerable amount of back traffic (say one month's) on the captured keys would be decoded and examined for any particular stupidity that might be going on e.g. commencing messages with a series of spaces. A catalogue based on this particular stupidity could then be produced: it would be enormous and ill suited for use in the field, but provided there were adequate "stupidities" breaking might be possible. If however plugboard settings were used the method would be impossible and breaking by "Wagner's party" out of the question. Colonel Vernham said that P/B's were not in use by the 8th Army in Tunisia, but that the 1st Army had possibly used them.

3. Colonel Tiltman siad that it had been decided some weeks ago that the time was ripe for a large scale investigation of the security of typex as no comprehensive examination had ever been made, but only ad hoc investigations regarding various individual points as they arose. The evidence now under discussion which had appeared since this decision was taken was not therefore the real reason why the investigation was being carried out.

4. A discussion ensued on various minor inconsistencies in the P.O.W's statements, but none of these carried enough weight to discredit or disprove the allegations. There was the possibility, though it seemed fairly remote, that officers of the German Army 'Y' Service had been told to tell a consistent fabricated story of German success with typex, if they became P.O.W's in order to embarrass us.

5. It was agreed that it was unlikely that any interrogations of [redacted] and [redacted], who were not members of the 'Y' Service, would ever provide any really satisfactory information and that every endeavour must be made to bring home some of the officers of [redacted].621 itself, particularly [redacted], [redacted] and anyone who might have performed the duties of the mythical "[redacted]".

6. The following decisions were made:-

(a) That it still appeared that the P.O.W's allegations

were possibly based on the truth and that no real evidence was yet available that might disprove their statements.

(b) That a further interrogation of HAUPTMEST and POSSEL should be carried out as soon as possible by Dr. Pickering and Professor Norman, possibly assisted by Major Babbage.

(c) That Colonel M.I.8. should endeavour to trace those members of DFAK.621 who were P.O.W's and have them brought home for interrogation wherever they were.

(d) That as much detail as possible should be obtained of typex usage and methods in Tunisia at the time under consideration.

(e) That the general investigation of typex security now planned should be proceeded with at an early date. Usage and all practical considerations would have to be extensively studied.

17th September, 1943.

NOT SECRET

(D 221) [redacted] 20.9.43.

Int. (asks for description of 'Auswertung' which P/W had visited).

P/W. There were several machines about the size of a typewriter, but deeper and flatter, with a key board like that of a typewriter. When a signal came in one of the duty officers or Obltn. [redacted] who was C.I. of the Company looked about for some funny key-words or key-letters (Kennworte, Kennbuchstaben) to see what kind of a key it was. Then they had a big filing cabinet with nothing but big type-writing sheets* with various numbers and letters and all sorts of things on them. These sheets had a key-number too and they compared them to find the right key. When they got it they gave it to an Obergefreiter who was sitting at one of these machine things and he set something which would make it come out.

Int. He was working at the English machine?

P/W. Yes.

Int. Not at the German one?

P/W. Well, they did a lot of them on the German machine. Now they decided - I think it depended whether they had got the key out or not - whether they did it on the English or the German machine. Mostly, generally, they worked with the English one. If they had found the key in these papers they always did it on the English machine - as far as I could see. I wasn't often there.

Int. Were they always English signals?

P/W. Yes - or American. They took less notice of German signals because they weren't a monitoring station as well.

Int. Were there other than English and American signals?

P/W. No, there hardly would be in that area.

Int. What were the traffics like? Very mixed?

P/W. They picked up all sorts of stuff; sometimes they got stuff from quite small lower formations say Kgt. to Abt. or Kgt. and Battalion.

Int. Were there sometimes signals of Air Liaison Officers with Armies. (Comment: a leading question - complete blank - question misunderstood and long digression on bad liaison between Army and R.A.F. 'Y').

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(D 186)

Int. How long did they work?

P/W. 24 hours.

Int. When was most work done?

P/W. All staff work was done mainly in the evening which means in practice: the decoding was done mainly in the early hours of the morning (Person) .... most signals intercepted during the evening and it was early morning by the time they were clear. I know one** once came at 4 in the morning.

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* Schreibmaschinenpapier, i.e. typing-paper, indicates size - say Continental quarto, not necessarily typewritten. But earlier statements make it clear that they were also typewritten.

** One what?

Int. Were the keys always broken currently or often with delay?

P/W. It often happened - but I don't know - I wasn't often with them - (COULD?) that they sometimes had to let things wait until something came from OKH. It was from OKH that these funny type-written sheets came. They got some keys out themselves, somehow. I don't know how they did it, and some 'things' they got from OKH or OKW.

Int. Direct from OKH?

P/W. Funkueberwachungsstelle [illegible]OKH.*

Int. That meant that frequently signals of different days had to be worked on on the same day.

(P/W misunderstood) Yes, mostly they were only able to get the beginning of a long signal out; when they saw it wasn't coming out, they left it.

Int. With the result that, say on the 9th of the month, the signals of the 7th 8th and 9th were all being worked at.

P/W. That can happen. And naturally, there were some that would not come out and they had to guess till they got it out. That might easily take up a fair time. But some signals they got out in an incredibly short time. (Q: work continuous; A: 3 shifts of 8 hours.)

P/W. The deciphered signals are then handed to the C.O. who does a preliminary sorting out of duplicates, makes out a weekly and a monthly report, clips them together and passes them to I.O. I.O. reads them, crosses out those he thinks are spoof or quatsch, sidelines the important ones and has them rolled off, passes then on to the Army and Divisional I.O.'s.

(No special extracts for Artillery Intelligence. P/W did not see the complete versions for Army Group I.O. but only copies, which went with identical texts, to Army, Corps and Div. I.O.'s.

On length and title of reports seen by P/W
"Morgenbericht fur die Woche von - bis -."
Very varying, sometimes 4-5 pages, sometimes 8, 10, 12 (hectographed). Summaries from these reports for I.O.'s. reappeared in paraphrase and abstract in Army Group or Army orders of the day -- "W/T Listening has established ..." etc.
P/W stated the Korpsgruppe Weber had no W/T Listening unit (i.e. P/W did not know that it had.)

P/W. I must say that in general the things were really of great importance. They knew a terrific amount; that thing about the 4th Division** that was terribly important for us, for it was the 4th Division that made the thrust through [illegible] towards [illegible] and that was right in the middle of our sector. Our centre was there, so it was very important.

Int. Can you think back: what did you read shortly before the fall? I mean, how much did you know before-hand?

P/W. Yes - we mostly know roughly, what kind of - that is we always know exactly how many divisions were opposite us.

* This is not a proper title. Funkueberwachung is 'monitoring' - evidently correctly used by P/W in previous extract. P/W previously at this point said OKH-Stelle (or Haupt-OKH-Stelle OKH).

** It has not bee possible to trace signals relating to this in GX/[illegible] 'Y' items.

Int. From the listening reports?

P/W. Without having taken a single prisoner. We knew exactly! We knew each position, boundary lines and everything - all these things. That was naturally very valuable, for it's quite different if I knew that this and that division is opposite me and that there are no doubtful divisions somewhere in the offing. That was important. But, as I said, the majority of the listening reports unfortunately didn't refer to our sector. Of course they interested us, but ...

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(D.230)

Int. When you spoke to Oberleutnant HABEL did he draw comparisons between English d/f signals that you intercepted and decoded, were they in various keys, or was it always one and the same key?

P/W. No, he said that almost every unit had a different key with it. I asked him, "How is it then; you can't decode all the signals with one key surely?" He said: no, that depended on the unit, that is they always know what W/T station had which key, roughly, and that it had to have some discriminant or something, and that they look it up.

Int. Were some of these keys more difficult than others?

P/W. Yes, that is, sometimes they didn't succeed in getting it out immediately. Then they probed around. Sometimes, too, they sent off signals which they hadn't decoded at all. They sent these to OKH.

Int. Did that happen frequently?

P/W. As far as I know .....

Int. Was there a certain number every day?

P/W. Very seldom, actually. According to what I was always told, that only happened .... and evidently when the messages came out they were of little importance, they came back to us through official channels, via OKH. What was in them was always either very out of date or often quite unimportant. I was once told that these long messages had always passages in them made up of "dot dot dot, 33 dots missing" or something of the sort

---

(D.231)

P/W. He said that often nothing came out of the passages that were missing, but there were other messages suddenly in the middle in quite a different key and this key must have been kept secret very well. In any case it was usually very difficult to get them out, according to what he said.**

Int. (paraphrased): were there ever supplementary IC reports giving text of passages not previously got out?

P/W. No, I never heard of the missing groups being supplied later. They put these signals aside with the parts simply 'missing'. There was, in fact, the impression sometimes from the run of the message that there was nothing missing. It broke off at the end of a sentence, and then this missing piece came, and then it continued with a sentence which could have

---

** I don't know the background here. Consider it possible that, that is meant is that OKH may on occasion have put 'groups missing' where it wanted to conceal from forward I that it had been successful with higher grade inserted signals.

P/W. fitted on directly to the last thing. Just looking at it externally* you couldn't tell whether this missing piece was part of the message or not. It didn't look as if the W/T operator had missed a passage out as if another W/T message in another key had been inserted. That's conceivable, because we do it a lot. Long signals are often broken off when something short and urgent comes in. If there's one of these long situation reports - and ours are much longer, up to two thousand groups - and something comes in in the middle, that has to go through more quickly , then I stop, and cut through the other signal, which with us too would be in another key. That's how I explain it.

Int.** They are probably figures (?).

P/W ** Yes, whether they said that or what I don't know, but in the reports there were never more than 33 groups.

---

* P/W means from the contents.

** I think the question here was incorrectly taken down and I cannot recall what was really asked. I am however fairly certain that P/W's list was "In the IC Reports it never said more than '33 groups missing'".

16.10.43.

MOST SECRET MESSAGE 031605A/November OUT

TO: B.A.D. Washington. Date 3.11.43.

NAVAL CYPHER (XD) PLUG.

From: D.N.I. Admiralty,

ROUTINE

If Colonel Cook of the I Staff of B.A.S. Washington asks your assistance in giving passage to 4 German P/W with knowledge of Y you should do all you can to expedite their return to this country where they are ugently needed for interrogation.

031605A

N.I.D. 1 (Ex. 1261)

Copy

MOST SECRET AS/1083

2nd November, 1943.

Dear Tait,

I think perhaps it may be well to record my impressions of our talk this morning.

i. Typex security:

(a) You asked my opinion of Typex and I stated that I am satisfied that when the conditions set out in my memorandum of 27th April, 1941 are completed, Typex will provide a very secure (and rapid) means of communication for normal service purposes.

(b) For purposes, however, where continual and lengthy cribs are handed out, i.e. communications with our representatives in U.S.A., Russia and for political purposes in general, it is not a satisfactory medium.

ii. For the most secret transmissions from Cabinet Offices, especially those falling under (b) above one time pad should be used.

iii. Where the Air Ministry representative cannot agree to majority decisions of the Cypher Security Committee he shall refer the matter to you for your decision.

Air Vice-Marshal V.H. Tait, O.B.E.,
Air Ministry,
Whitehall,
S.W.1.

~~HOT SECRET~~

To: WASHINGTON

18. 10. 43.

CHG 610

Following for C.C.S. only.

Further to my telegram 609 October 18th.

Begins: Have now located [redacted] so you can have all four when and where you like. Ends.

Distribution:
D.S.(5)
D.M.I.
Colonel Tiltman
Lt. Comdr. Dudley Smith

MOST SECRET

From: WASHINGTON

18. 10. 43.

CXG 609

Following for C.S.S.

Your CXG 773 of 10th October, 1943.

Following from General STRONG: Begins:

Reference your request of tenth, the following individuals have been located and are at your disposition: First Lieutenant HEINRICH HABEL, serial number 8 WG -13185. Marks on identity disk: H KP N 26 14.

First Lieutenant HANS BRUER, serial number 8 WG -13145. Marks on identity disk: F.H.ST. 56. This is one of the sections of the German Army Field Force, and it would be entirely logical for a 'Y' liaison detachment officer or an espionage officer to be attached to such a section.

Prisoner's date of birth 20th January 1913.

Lieutenant ALFRED BEHREND, serial number 8 WG-12893. Identity disk says: K.D NEAPEL. This would mean that this prisoner of war belonged to the Naples "Command" (established and regular part of the German Army Staff). Date of birth of this prisoner 7th December 1921.

I think the above-named are three of the four men you require. They have refused to answer any questions, and none of them have paybooks.

If you want to take a chance on identity I suggest you take delivery of the three men named above at any place you desire in the UNITED STATES and ship them on a British ship. Too damn much red tape otherwise.

No trace yet of WACHTMEISTER SEVNECK (or SEVENNECK)

but enquiry proceeding. Ends.

Distribution:
D.D.(S)
D.M.I.
Colonel Tiltman
Lt. Comdr. Dudley Smith

10/X/43

Colonel Tiltman

Lt. Cmdr. Dudley Smith.

Mr. Veltman & Mr. Alexander.

Major Gadd.

(Wg/Cdr. OTTLEY to see later)

Attached, translation of relevant portions of Haunhorst interrogation.

Interrogators felt that P/W was perfectly frank and willing to help. The only effort at concealment affected the names of members of Company 621. Having said 'Oberleutnant' he tried to blurt the name HABEL, but when he again had to refer to the gentleman, he called him HABEL, possibly having noticed that we had heard it correctly. P/W however, was definitely becoming stale.

One passage, which we appear to have cut out, in our interrogating at P/W camp, dealt with Wachtmeister WAGNER. P/W said HABEL answered the phone in his own name. Otherwise it was 'Wachtmeister WAGNER.' Bad hearing on field telephone: it would not occur to anyone to question whether it was always the same voice that said 'WAGNER speaking.'

(Am holding German text for a few more days and will be glad to check any passage, or produce German used at any point.)

F.H. Pickering

(PAX 319)

MOST SECRET.

TO: WASHINGTON. 10a.

CXG 773. Following for O'CONNOR from C.S.S.

---

A. We are particularly anxious to interrogate here in U.K. following four German P.O.W. all of Nachrichten Fern Aufklarungs Kompanie 621, captured in TUNISIA in mid-May 1943 and believed to be in AMERICA.

1) Obltn. HEINRICH HABEL, O.C. Coy., last located (according to another P.O.W.) at Camp 204 in North AFRICA in June and reported by ALGIERS on August 25th as probably being in AMERICA. He had been Sergeant Major in the 'Y' Unit 3.N.56 in FRANCE and was commissioned at the end of 1941.

2) Wachmeister SEVENECK (or SEVENBECK), described as a "specialist".

3) Obltn. BREMER, Head of 'Y' Liaison Detachment.

4) Ltn. BEHREND, at one time O.C. of an Advanced Detachment.

Other details of these P.O.W's unfortunately unknown. Efforts to trace them by War Office have proved fruitless and we think they were transferred to U.S.A. unidentified as personnel of a 'Y' Unit.

B. Please approach General STRONG on behalf of myself and D.M.I., and ask his support in having these P.O.W's transferred as soon as possible from U.S. to British ownership and sent to U.K. D.P.W. here is willing to accept them.

C. You should explain that we hope this interrogation will throw light on how far Germans exploited certain British cypher material known to have been captured at TOBRUK, and of which these P.O.W's are said to have knowledge. Interrogation by British Experts in U.K. is therefore essential, and one of the deepest concern to us.

---

FROM WASHINGTON. 13.10.43.

CXG 609. Following for C.S.S., from General STRONG.

Your CXG 773 of 10.10.43.

Reference your request of tenth, the following individuals have been located and are at your disposition: First Lieutenant HEINRICH HABEL, serial number 8 WG -[illegible]. Marks on identity disk: H KP N 26 14.

First Lieutenant HANS BREMER, serial number 8 WG -13145. Marks on identity disk: F.H.ST. 56. This is one of the sections of the German Army Field Forces, and it would be entirely logical for a 'Y' liaison detachment officer or an espionage officer to be attached to such a section. Prisoner's date of birth 20th January, 1913.

Lieutenant ALFRED BEHREND, serial number 8 WG -12093. Identity disk says: KTD NEBEN. This would mean that this prisoner of war belonged to the Kriegs "Command (established and regular part of the German Army Staff). Date of birth of this prisoner 7th December, 1921.

I think the above-named are three of the four men you require. They have refused to answer any questions, and none of them have pay-books. If you want to take a chance on identity I suggest you take delivery of the three men named above at any place you desire in the UNITED STATES and ship them on a British ship. Too damn much red tape otherwise.

No trace yet of WACHMEISTER SEVENECK (or SEVENBECK).

Have now located SEVENBECK so you can have all four when and where you like.

HOST SECRET. 1/943.

C.S.S.

The interrogation of a P.O.W. recently brought home from Tunisia has brought to light evidence that during the Tunisian Campaign the German Army Y Service were able to exploit in the field a certain amount of British army type traffic.

Although it seems unquestionable that their success was largely due to the capture of machines and keys at Tobruk, it is not at all clear to what extent, if at all, Berlin supplied them with new settings, etc., obtained cryptographically, or whether they succeeded in obtaining a copy of the new settings by physical means in Tunisia.

The P.O.W. in question, Leutnant [redacted], a Divisional Intelligence Officer who was friendly with the officers of the "Y" unit NFA. 621, and who received their reports, has been interrogated three times (once by Oeser and Pickering from C.C.P.W.) but as a non-expert he cannot enlighten us on the technical points regarding the use of the captured machines which I consider it is most important to determine at the earliest possible moment.

Nearly all the personnel of the actual "Y" unit (Nachrichten Fern Aufklarungs Kompanie 621) were captured in Tunisia in mid-May 1943, but owing to the difficulties at the time were not segregated, were able to destroy their identification papers, and because "lost" in the general mass of captured German personnel, and are probably now all in America.

/ There are

MOST SECRET. 43/943.

There are four members of the Company who would be particularly valuable to us and I consider that every effort should be made to identify and bring them back to this country as soon as possible for interrogation.

They are:-

(a) Obltn. Heinrich H[illegible], the O.C. of the Coy. Last located at Camp 204 in North Africa in June (according to a P.O.W.'s statement) and reported by Algiers on 25/8 as probably being in America. Habel is unfortunately a common name; this man was commissioned at about the end of 1941, he had previously been a Sgt. Major with the "Y" Unit 3.N.56 in France.

(b) Wachtmeister [illegible] (or [illegible]) Described as a "specialist". No other details known, but the name is an unusual one. He is probably the N.C.O. who did the actual operating of the typex machines.

(c) Obltn. [illegible]. Head of the "Y" Liaison Detachment of the Company. No other details known.

(d) Ltn. [illegible]. At one time in charge of an Advanced Detachment of the Company.

The first two of the above are most likely to be able to provide the precise information we want but I would be grateful if you could press for all four to be assembled at C.S.D.I.C. (W.) as soon as possible.

27th September 1943.

To: Lt. Cmdr. Dudley Smith
From: T.P.Pickering.

Hut 3.
Room 43.
September 3rd.

6

Reference: Wachtmeister Wagner and associated problems.

1) It has proved impossible to find any trace in the 'Y' reports we have seen ~~to identify~~ of the signal dealing with the move of the 4th. Armoured Division, which Manhorst thought he remembered.

2) I think we shall not be far wrong if we assume that the real name of the mystic Wachtmeister Wagner is: SEVENHECK.

On 9/5 Generaloberst von Arnim was asked (via Chief Armed Forces Signals Officer of C.in C South) by OKW and OKW/Personnel Dept. to have the following brought back from Tunisia:

(five names, including Oberst KARN)

"In addition, if possible, the following specialists:"

Obltn. [illegible]
Obltn. HABEL
Wachtmeister SEVENHECK. (last three)

(underlining mine.) CX/MSS 2571, para 3.

Manhorst was convinced that Wagner was a code, not a cover-name. I think it is safe to assume that Sevenheck is either dead or in Soviet hands. Or will remember that Wagner was not to be taken alive.'

T/Pickering

A.5536

3L.

22. 9. 43.

Commander Travis.

On Monday 20th, Dr. Pickering and I interviewed Ltn. HAUNHORST at the request of Col. Tiltman, to find out whether we could prove or disprove his story that Type-X was being read by the Germans in Tunisia.

HAUNHORST was merely a casual visitor to the German Y station, run by N.F.A.K. 621. Though he did his best to co-operate, his knowledge of cyphers was not sufficient to enable him to notice or comment upon the really salient aspects of Type-X cryptography.

The various documents in the case mention a mysterious "Wachtmeister WAGNER". WAGNER appears to be a cover name.

CX/MSS has, however, given us the name of WACHTMEISTER SEVENECK.× From CX/MSS and HAUNHORST we know that the O.C. of the company was Obltn. HABEL. He is thought to be in the U.S.A. An Obltn. BREMER was also a member of the company (N.F.A.K. 621).

In view of the importance of this matter, it is essential that C.S.S. be asked to request that the following should be assembled at C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) as soon as possible, for thorough interrogation:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| HABEL, | Obltn. Heinrich | all of N.F.A.K. 621 captured as a whole in TUNISIA, mid-May 1943. |
| BREMER, | Obltn. - | |
| SEVENECK,× | Wachtm. - | |

×or SEVENHECK

O/JCP/15452/22/9/43.

Obj. for Col. Tiltman

W. Tilman

for your attention please

To: D.D.(S).
From: W.G. Welchman.

INTERROGATION OF HAUNHORST AND PASSEL.

This story about the mysterious Wagner sounds like a garbled account of something true. I imagine that, having captured a few Type X machines, the Germans would have the sense to maintain a forward decoding party to take full advantage of any captured keys, but it seems unlikely that we should have lost any Type X keys in Tunisia and the story suggests that there is far more in it than that. Of course intercept operators tend to believe that everything they intercept is decoded, and the officers of NFAK 621 might tend to give an exaggerated idea of their successes. All the same it does rather sound as if Wagner may have decoded some Type X messages. This could have been done in three ways.

a) Keys may have been captured or obtained through agents.

b) Keys may have been broken in Berlin or elsewhere and sent to Wagner.

c) Keys may have been broken by Wagner and his party on the spot, with the help of catalogues.

I imagine that the first possibility can be ruled out. As regards breaking, I have always felt that the Germans could not be breaking any of our Type X traffic because, if they were, they would take steps to prevent us breaking their enigma traffic. But this may be overestimating the efficiency of the Germans; after all we ourselves have made no serious attempt to use the experience of the experts on breaking the German enigma to improve the security of our Type X. Alternatively the Germans may have been breaking Type X before the introduction of pluggable heads by catalogue methods which would be knocked out by their stecker.

I have never thought seriously about possible methods of breaking Type X, but should have guessed that the equipment necessary would be pretty bulky unless the problem is being simplified by extreme carelessness. Thus whether Wagner could have broken 8th Army Type X traffic or not depends on how the 8th Army have been handling the traffic. A thorough investigation of this would be a big undertaking, and I think the only satisfactory method would be to intercept the 8th Army traffic and study the logs.

However something might be done to check up on the story without a full investigation. We know a fair amount about NFAK 621, the unit to which Wagner belonged, from "E" decodes. It seems fairly certain that this unit failed to get away from Tunisia, and it is rather odd that we have received no captured documents or interrogation reports. I should like to arrange a meeting early next week with Dudley-Smith, Gadd, Oeser, Pickering and Vernham. In the meantime I should like to ask Vernham to check up one or two small points and to obtain some details of the Allied W/T communications in Africa at the time of the Tunisian campaign.

For a full dress investigation I should want to go into the following points.

1. Construction of Type X keys.

2. Distribution of keys, and allocation of keys for local use in Africa. Whether this allocation is determined in London or not. Whether authorities in Africa can use a set of keys more than once.

3. Details of machines and keys used by 8th Army before and after fall of Tobruk.

4. What material was compromised at Tobruk and what steps were taken as a result. In general what regulations are laid down for dealing with a compromise.



5. Details of W/T networks/

5. Details of W/T networks, procedure and types of traffic.

6. Organisation of cipher offices. Whether encoding is ever done by wireless operators. Details of endoding procedure.

7. Full study of logs and decodes both of Type X and of associated type of traffic over a fairly long period.

8. If possible a study of Type X traffic on the keys compromised at Tobruk.

On the whole I feel that a thorough investigation would be a good thing, but I don't see who could do it. However it may be possible to shoot down the Wag story after further discussion here and further interviews with P.O.W's. It is quite possible that Haunhorst was merely shown how the Type X machine worked, and it would be interesting to know whether he actually saw an English message decoded.

6

**MOST SECRET**

To: Lt. Commander Dudley-Smith.

From: W.G. Welchman.

17th September, 1943.

Copy to Colonel Tiltman.
File: 2 copies.

Not knowing the first thing about our own W/T communications in Africa, it is practically impossible either to get a clear idea of what is implied by the Wagner story or to make the most of a further interview with Haunhorst and other P. of W's. It will help if you can get the following information.

1. A general description of all our W/T communications in Africa, stations, the types of traffic passed on the various links and networks, and giving an estimate of the location and number of the enemy intercept sets that would be required to cover it all.

2. Details of all W/T communications in Africa passing Type X traffic at the time of the Wagner story, particularly -

a) Frequencies and power used on each link or network, with an estimate of the range of audibility for German interception.

b) What Type X keys were used on each link.

c) A rough idea of the nature of the content of the various types of traffic.

d) Some idea of the volume of traffic on the various links.

3. Very roughly how the W/T picture and the use of different Type X keys developed from the time of the compromise at Tobruk to the Tunisian campaign. Were there any types of traffic which kept going continuously?

4. What drums, keys and message setting books may conceivably have been compromised? How much traffic could have been read by the enemy by this means?

5. What other drums and message setting books are in use, and how extensively pluggable heads have been used.

6. Details of drums, message setting books and keys in use at the time of the Wagner story, particularly what keys were being used to pass traffic

a) without the use of pluggable heads.

b) with possibly compromised drums.

c) with possibly compromised message setting books.

Tel. No.—

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to :—
The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office
(as opposite),
and the following number quoted.

A.I. 5(b)(2)

A.I. 4/4/45

*Your Reference*

THE WAR OFFICE, [illegible]

[illegible]

2nd Echelon, [illegible]

**MOST SECRET**

Memorandum for:-

Lieut. Cmdr. Dudley Smith, R.N.,
G.S.I.(b).

1. I attach hereto a paper giving replies to the questionnaire which you sent to us. One or two of these answers are probably wrong particularly the designation of certain units, but that may be due to the period of time which has elapsed.

2. One point may be of interest, and that is the statement that the majority of traffic was between the 8th Army and A.F.H.Q., as I believe that 8th Army were using the old drums whereas the 'hollows' were used by 1st Army.

3. I do not know that we have got very much further with the matter, but if there is anything more that you want to know [illegible]

[illegible]

Lieut. Col., G.S.

Copy to Lieutenant Commander Wiggin-Smith.

MOST SECRET AZ/863

1st September, 1943.

Dear Vernham,

With reference to your letter of 23rd August 1943, regarding the further interrogation of HAUPTMANN and POSSEL, I attach a copy of our questionnaire which was telephoned to M.I.8 yesterday morning.

Unquestionably the man we really want for detailed interrogation is WAGNER and I would be very grateful if you could take all possible steps to get him sent home as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Colonel J.P. Vernham,
M.I.8.

Dictated to
M.I.8
31.8.43

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HAUNHURST AD POSTEL.

1. What did WAGNER's "Typex" machines look like ? (Obtain as full a description as possible to ensure typex and not American cyphering machines involved).

2. Where were the Typex documents captured ?

3. Have the P.O.W's seen the captured documents themselves ? What did they look like ? Colour, size, thickness, layout.

4. What did the "catalogues" prepared by Berlin look like ? How were the ones set out which determined drum settings and tyre positions ? Were they in K.G.S., typed or printed ?

5. Were the messages usually complete or did the more secret ones often consist of a first or middle or last portion. If the la ter, what was the length of such portions ?

6. How often did the drums have to be removed from the machine and altered ?

7. What were the most common Allied addressees in the B.J's ? more secret.
Did American authorities appear frequently in the addresses ?

8. What sort of addresses did the messages giving convoy movements have ?

9. Give as much detail as possible of one or two particular messages of a secret nature - messages P.O.W. would remember because their content was especially valuable, or startling, or amusing.

10. What was the average time lag between interception (or T.O.O.) of high grade messages and promulgation of the B.J. ?

11. What was the shortest time lag ?

12. How often were the B.J's sent to Berlin by wireless teleprinter ?

621

13. Might it be possible that NPAK/used a code word on the B.J's to indicate those obtained from high grade cyphers ?

14. When did the Coy. have their first success with reading high grade traffic ?

15. When did they get into their stride ?

16. Could Berlin supply WAGNER with the necessary information for decyphering in most cases when he could not get the messages out himself ?

17. How long did it take to get the information from Berlin ?

18. How many high grade five-letter messages were intercepted daily by NPAK 621 ?

19. What were the main frequencies on which interception was carried out ?

20. Was NPAK.621 fed with high grade intercepts from other sources ?

21. Was similar decoding of high grade done in Sicily or Italy ?

22. Did senior officers ever visit the Coy. and show interest in WAGNER's work ?

23. What were the locations of NPAK.621 during the time that WAGNER was reading Typex ? How near to the front line were they ?

24. What is known of WAGNER's previous history before he joined the Coy. What was he in private life ?

COPY

6.

The War Office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

M.I.6. MOST SECRET 23rd August, 1943.

Dear Travis,

I attach hereto a report on the interrogation of two German officers, undertaken by Captain Heller of this Section. In view of the contents thereof, I have done nothing with regard to the distribution of this report until I hear from you as to the action which you would like us to take.

In this report we have endeavoured to keep to actual statements made by the P.o.Ws. and have not drawn any deductions.

Both P.o.Ws. are being held at our disposal and my object in submitting the report to you first is to find out if you wish us to take up any particular line when further cross examining them. Taking these statements at their face value, the situation appears to be somewhat alarming, but there appear to be so many inconsistencies that it might be possible to rule out some of the statements as being an impossibility.

You will recollect at the time of the fall of Tobruk that a complete cipher team with equipment and books was rounded up with the rest of the Garrison and the Cipher Officer was evacuated from Tobruk to Crete by submarine. He subsequently escaped and on his return stated that the drums and message and machine settings books were destroyed prior to capture. Even if his statement was untrue, the settings used in the Tunisian campaign (and this report only deals with that Campaign), were entirely different, nor can I see that the

supposed/

Commander C.M.Travis, O.B.E.,
D.D.(S),
B.P.

JHV/WH

supposed method as described in paragraph 4 either tallies with the present practise or even if it did, would enable High-grade Typex to be read from settings captured at Tobruk. No settings as far as I am aware were compromised by capture in Tunisia which leaves only the possibility of leakage of information within North African Command as a possible source from which these settings could have been obtained.

The statement in paragraph 3 that all traffic from A.F.H.Q. to the three Armies was read, appears to be somewhat inaccurate as at that time only the First and Eighth Armies were under the Command of 18 Army Group, but had any traffic passed direct from A.F.H.Q. to a U.S. formation, it would surely have been in BDM and not Typex.

There are plenty of chances of shooting holes through these statements but I thought the best thing was to let you have this information and ask you to let me know how you would like further interrogations handled. In the meantime no distribution has been given to this report and it will not be distributed until I hear from you.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) J.R. Vernham.

COPY

MOST SECRET
OPTICAL ONLY

Copy No.

First Interrogation report on two
German Army Officers captured in Tunisia.

(Carried out by M.I.8.(a) with the co-operation
and facilities of C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.) ).

This report is MOST SECRET and should not be passed
beyond the listed distribution without previous
reference to M.I.8.

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INSECURITY OF BRITISH CIPHERS

1. PERSONALIA

(a) HAUNHORST Hanswolf, Leutnant. b.19.3.21.
Staff 334 Inf.Div.
This officer was Div. Intelligence Officer specialising in enemy Artillery Intelligence. He is an anti-Nazi by conviction and is prepared to be as co-operative as he possibly can. During his service in Africa he became very friendly with the officers of 621 Interception Coy. and has a good working knowledge of the organisation and work of the Coy. He was himself, on the distribution of the "B.J.s" and periodical Wireless Intelligence reports issued by the Coy. and took particular interest in the methods by which the information contained in the B.Js. was obtained.

(b) POSSEL Werner, Oberleutnant.b.22.2.18.
10 Pz. A.O.K. Nachr.Regt. Funkstellenführer.
Possel was O.C. of the senior fixed Army Wireless station in Africa, HeFu 7, and as such controlled all other HeFu's in Africa. For a time he was Funksachbearbeiter with the staff of H.Gr. Africa. He was friendly with the officers of 621 Intercept Coy. and had the handling of much of their wireless traffic.

The facts cited in this report were obtained for the most part from Haunhorst, and confirmed independently by Possel. No attempt was made during the Interrogation to pursue any of the statements made as it was considered undesirable at this juncture to risk putting ideas into the P.o.Ws. heads, and it was decided to wait until the facts could be checked and any specific points followed up.

2. HAND CIPHERS

A new Hand Cipher introduced for the Tunisian campaign was broken and read continuously by the Bey. By the description given of the traffic read, this particular cipher appears to have been in general use below Divisional level. Several examples of this cipher were captured and from the description given by P.o.W. would appear to be the "JOSUA". The American "Hagelin" cipher was regularly read with the aid of captured machines.

3/

3. HIGH-GRADE CIPHERS.

P.o.W. stated that priority was given to the interception of all Army High-Grade traffic. This traffic was treated cryptographically by the Coy. with considerable success. All traffic from A.F.H.Q. to the three Armies was read regularly, and as a result, details were known of every Allied attack. In addition, the composition, dates of arrival and loading of all convoys teaching North Africa were known several days in advance and speculation was rife concerning the date of the first appearance of new units or equipment mentioned in this traffic. The information was issued in the form of B.Js. which, however, gave no indication whatever of the source; thus it was impossible to tell whether it was plain language, lowgrade hand cipher or High-grade traffic. For the most part, the messages were of a long term strategical staff nature, dealing with both operations and supplies.

4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS EMPLOYED.

All high grade traffic was handled by a certain Warrant Officer WAGNER. This man had at his disposal one or more British Type-X machines captured at Tobruch, a machine resembling a German Enigma machine, and a special type of typewriter which had an adjustable keyboard. In addition a number of reference books were employed from which the Type-X settings were taken. The procedure appears to have been as follows:

> The message was examined and the "Kenngruppe" (Discriminant) looked up in a book. This gave a reference to another reference book where the actual setting of the machine was found. The machine (Type-X) was then set and the message decoded.

In certain cases this procedure did not work, and in this case, certain information was sent to O.K.H.Berlin who were able to supply the necessary information for the deciphering of the traffic.

The documents used appear to have been of two varieties - Captured British Cipher documents giving message settings and machine settings, which the interrogater has not yet been able to identify, and documents compiled by the "Haupt Chiffrier Stelle OKH", which appear to be reconstructions of message settings and drum settings based on a detailed analysis of high grade traffic during the past 3-4 years. From these documents it would appear to be possible, once the message setting has been deciphered to determine the drum settings and tyre positions by reference to the previous occurrence of the message setting.

All High-Grade traffic is passed to Berlin for detailed [illegible], and when the [illegible] by any of the above [illegible] to be dealt with [illegible], providing sufficient evidence exists [illegible], with results in many cases.

5. [illegible] OF I.Js.

[illegible] from cryptographic sources is, as already mentioned, [illegible] by the interrogation, to the Intelligence Office of the senior formation where it is evaluated and distributed to all interested parties. Such information may be passed to Berlin by ordinary wireless channels; the normal route is by courier, although in exceptional cases such information may be passed by encoded wireless telegraph.

6/

6. [illegible]

[illegible] the course of an interrogation of Lt. [illegible] carried out at P.o.W. [illegible] in June, 1943, this T.o.T. gave certain information regarding the work of a certain Sgt. [illegible] of G.H.Q. Intercept Coy. This information called that Sgt. [illegible] operating a Typex machine and decoding British High Grade traffic. Little credence was given to this account at the time owing to the unreliability of Lt. BODE. However, owing to this information being now confirmed by two independent witnesses, Lt. BODE's story appears to be substantially correct and adds further confirmation to the accounts given by Lt. Haunhorst and Oberlt. Possel. In addition to the now confirmed statement of Lt. BODE, there have been, during the past month several references to reading British High-Grade ciphers in Berlin; notable among these is a statement by Oberlieut. Paul, Five Tunis, that information concerning intended air attacks and Air Force operations was sent to Tunis by Berlin under "Most Secret" cover. This information appears to have been of a nature which could not be passed in other than High-Grade cipher.

7. [illegible]

From the evidence supplied by the above mentioned P.o.W. it would seem that the German Interception Service is capable of reading certain of our High Grade ciphers by means of captured settings, documents and captured Cipher Machines, found at Pozzuoli, as well as by means of analysis of High-Grade traffic and subsequent reconstruction of settings by cryptographic methods. By no means all settings were read, as for example, there is no evidence to believe that any of the special "Y" service settings were known to the Germans. No effort has yet been made to identify the documents used by the Intercept Coy. in Africa, nor have any of the leads given by the interrogation been followed up as yet. Future and more detailed interrogations may yield some more definite information.

[illegible] August, 1943.

Captain [illegible]

BERTIE

19.7.42

1735 B.S.T.

19.7.42

1800

19.7.42
2050

N.B.M.

Cdr. Travis

C' has spoken to you about this

CMG. 11.

Dix sept Juillet onze.

De source pouvant etre consideree comme sure.

Le RLM utilise actuellement deux machines a chiffrer Anglaises qui seraient tomees intact aux mains des Allemands lors des operations de mille neuf cents quarante dans le nord de la France a Dunkerque probablement: elles ont ete adaptees au mode de chiffrement par groupes de cinq lettres au lieu de quatre en usage dans la R.A.F.

A suivre.

Copies C.S.S., C.O.S., and Commander Dunderdale.

BERTIE

19.7.42.

1724 BST

19.7.42.

1800 BST

B .A./L.M.

19.7.42.
1915 BST

CXG/12

Dix huit juillet douze. S uite.

Les techniciens les plus competants du RLM accordent une ingeniosite extraordinaire a ce type de machine: il n'a pas ete possible de les imiter jusqu'ici.

Ces deux machines sont en service entre Berlin (RLM A) et GOLDAP (OBLT-REGIMENT MUSCHKI).

Au dessus du CLAVIER se trouvent les trois [illegible] de OSATION suivant la clef employee: LUFTGAU.AC.H.M.SCHLUESSEL LUFTGAU.AC.H.M.SCHLUESSEL-UST.

Copies sent C.S.S., C.O.S., P.5.

To Mr de Grey
From F. NORMAN

21/7/42

(1) MSS/Evidence

1920/31/8/40. ( ck/Oa/272)
- Unimportant text addressed to:
An LN Regt Ob d L (Regt HUSCHKE)
in CHATEAU HOISY bei CELLE ueber
DINANT.

---

0920/6/9/40 ( ck/Ja/290)
Unimportant text.
Addressed: An LN Regt HUSCHKE,
PARIS.
SIGNED: LN Rgt d. Ob. d. L. (IIa)

---

1600/27/6/41 ( ck/MSS/13)
An Funkbetriebsstelle 660 fuer Obltn.
MAEHRLEIN.
1) Ab 28/6/0000 Uhr, sind die Sterne
1, 2, 3 und 6 vom Gefechtsstand f.u.

besetzen
2) Abfahrt des Sonderzuges wird rechtzeitig
mitgeteilt
3) Oberstleutnant HUSCHKE eintrifft 28/6,
1100 in ROSTKEN. Oblts. MAERLEIN
meldet nach Landung Einsatzbereitschaft
in funktechnischer Beziehung.
4) Hptm MARKE eintrifft mit PKW a.
30/6: Quartier ist vorzubereiten.

(signed) Hptm MARKE

NOTE. Hptm MARKE of Obd L Regt
well known as pioneer first in High-
speed tape work, and later in connect-
ion with 'Sagefisch' ( ~~Fish stage~~ GAF
non-morse transmission by secret
teleprinter). On the same day, Marke
was enquiring about a special apparatus
(SONDERGERAET) for V/LN Regt Obd L,
and when it arrived. This is
probably connected with the fact that
22/LN Regt Obd L was, at this time, collecting
a special train (ENZIANZUG) at Paris
which was equipped with Secret Tele-
printer.

The following 2 texts will help to elucidate the activity that was going on at the time:-

2230/27/6/41:

An Funkbetriebsstelle 660 für Ltn. SCHENK-

MANN.

1) Auf Befehl Hptm MARKE hat Obltn. MAEHRLEIN 2 Sender in Marsch zu setzen. Eintreffen bei 660 bis 1100/28/6, da General dort eintrifft.

2) Sonderzug ROBINSON ist ab 2300 Uhr zu besetzen bis 28/6, 1400 Uhr.

3) Funkbetriebsstelle Ob d L Gebermittel Verkehr der Führungnetzsterne I, II, III, VI bis Tastleitung dort klar.

Fubst. Ob d L

2330/27/6/41:

An Funkstelle 660.

Morgen ab 8 Uhr bereithalten für H.Q. Reichsmarschall ASIEN. Frequenz: A, ½ stündige Besetzung Funker.

H.Q. Reichsmarschall ASIEN

0949/4/4/42

An Oberstltn. HUSCHKE, GOLD AP.
Bitte sofort durch Funkspruch Lgenachrichten
zu wollen, dass der Kdr. SAAGER zum
St.z.b.V. II / LN Ob d L versetzt oder
kommandiert wird.

Blumroeder, Major

This last text shows that at that time HUSCHKE was still in command of LN Regt Ob d L.

---

(2) Mr Colman has no information that would be useful but reminds me of some unidentified 5-letter waffle the Turin has been looking at.

---

(3) Mr Morrison (of M.I.8) has nothing to add

(4) (Capt. Gt.J) has nothing to add but thinks that most traffic between Edinburgh and Berlin is almost bound to be non-morse.

---

(5) Captain FIRNBERG (the MI 8 D/F expert) has no relevant information.

---

(6) BEAU MANOR has little hope but is investigating and will produce results, if any, by 22/7/42.

22/7/

DS/INT/4

10

B.C.G/AF/VO OSF THRU

C MSS/1189/T12

MEDITERRANEAN

AXIS INTELLIGENCE

==========

1. ON 12/7 IDA FROSCH NOTIFIED KALIF THAT INSPECTOR HARMS, ACCOMPANIED BY OBERREGIERUNGSRET DR. VOGELE, WAS BEING SENT ON A MISSION FROM 19/7 TO 25/7 TO INSPECT MATERIAL CAPTURED ON THE LIBYAN-EGYPTIAN BATTLEFIELD WITH A VIEW TO OBTAINING CIPHER DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (KEYS, ENCODING MACHINES ETC.) AND ASKED KALIF TO GIVE THE MISSION EVERY SUPPORT AND HELP.

D.D/AM/WO (A)

HSN/GB/JH 0528/14/7/42

TT 0527/14/7/42 IBF +

AM WIII

REF.612.

CX/MSS/1139/T13

SENT 0528/14/7/42

FROM [illegible] (CX/MSS/1139/T12 REF. (12) THE FOLLOWING WAS

[illegible] AT AS FK 3945 FOR AIR ONLY. IMPORTANT.

[illegible] IS TO INSPECT CAPTURED MATERIAL

[illegible] 24TH AND 25TH JULY WITH A VIEW TO

[illegible] COMMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SUCH AS KEYS,

[illegible] AND THE LIKE.

1756/14/7/42

AL

HR. 291.
0812/16/7/42.

TO: JOINTS ON.
GAD. 122/290
JULY 16.
FROM M.C.I.I.
REF. YOUR AX 55; JULY 14.

NO COMPROMISE BY CAPTURE OF ANY U.A.F. U.A.F.
CYPHER IS KNOWN HERE.

PARA TWO. ARMY FIELD GRADE CYPHERS INCLUDING
THREE FIGURE CAPTURED. ONLY CLUE TO METHOD
MACHINE IS CATCH A DEVICE WITH CODE ONES ON
ADDRESS BASED USED FOR R/T . R/T CODE BY ARMY FIELD
DIVISIONS.

PARA THREE. MATCHING DEVELOPMENTS OF CYPHER.
WILL SIGNAL ANY FURTHER INFORMATION IMMEDIATELY.

TOMMY.
HOLD TO SITTING.
...F.

HQ61.

PA.

PWM/G/712. MOST SECRET.

The following message in code has been received from a British Prisoner of War in GERMANY.

IF FURTHER CIRCULATION OF THIS INFORMATION IS MADE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ITS SOURCE SHOULD NOT BE DIVULGED.

---

Date of Message : 15 Aug 42.

Rank of Sender : Captain.

Camp Location : Oflag VI B, Dossel, Nr. Warburg.

---

COLONEL STEVENSON C.S.O. S. AFRICA DIVISION REPORTS THAT ALL CODES CIPHERS TELEX MACHINES AND DRUMS DESTROYED TOBRUK BEFORE JERRY'S ENTERED. DESTRUCTION THERE AND MERSA MATRUH VERY EFFECTIVE INCLUDING ALL WATER PLANTS AND PETROL.

Lieut.-Colonel, G.S.

M.I.9.
Tel. W.O. 1296/7.
Sub. Ext. 70.

19 Sep 42.

Distribution by M.I.9.

D.D.M.I. (P/W).
M.I.10.
M.I.19.
Sigs. 6.
N.I.D.1(P/W) (Mr. Chas. Mitchell).
A.I.(K) (A.M. Dist.).
M.I.3.
M.I.14.
M.I.6(d).
G.C.C.S.
N.I.D. III P/W.
A.I.1(a) P/W.
G.H.Q., M.E. (By tel.).

T SECRET

To: Washington

2. 7. 43.

CXG 109

Following from C.S.S. Personal for 22800

A. D.D.M.I. (P/W) has sent following telegram to COOK begins:

"Lieutenant BODE German Army sent here by North Africa en route U.S.A. for use I understand at Fort HUNT as potential gun-dog expected depart by air June 25th repeat 25th. While waiting passage have held him at C.S.D.I.C. where observation indicates doubtful reliability and desirability careful testing before reposing full confidence. Ends"

BODE has now left U.K.

B. You should know that this P.W. was in German 'Y' Service until June 1940 and when interrogated in U.K. spoke of having deciphered British traffic by a machine during Battle of France. No typex machines had been captured by that date and BODE's statements were vague and possibly intended to draw rather than to give information. We have reserved judgment until we can interrogate another P.W. called WAGNER now in Tunisia whose transfer has been requested and who BODE says used the machine.

C. I consider the proposed use of BODE as highly dangerous.

P.E.C.

D. If you think it advisable please approach General Strong and enlist his support to prevent action at least until we have seen WAGENER.

A 2102

M.I.8.(a) internal

MOST SECRET

D.D.I. (through M.I.8. G.S.O.1.)

## Security of British Ciphers
## Interrogation of Lt. BODE, late 3/H/26

1. During the interrogation of the above P.o.W. certain information regarding the German Y service successes with British ciphers was obtained. Owing to the nature of this information, I am not including it in the general report of the interrogation.

2. BODE when asked what his duties with the Intercept company comprised, during the time he was on active service with them, (1937 - June 4 1940) replied that he translated and emended British messages. Asked for further details, he made the following statement:-

BODE "I emended the plain language texts which came off the machine. The texts were often very garbled, and I had a lot of difficulty in reading them. Sometimes I also filled in a lot of holes in a square".

M.F.H. "I don't quite understand about the machine. What kind of machine was this?".

BODE "A sort of typewriter. A man just typed the nonsense stuff, and the English came out on a tape. A second man stuck the tape onto a sheet of paper, and I read and translated this."

M.F.H. "Where did this nonsense stuff, as you call it, come from?"

BODE "Straight from the interception room. It was divided up into preamble, text, just a jumble of letters divided into groups of 5 letters, and then there was something else, I can't quite remember what that was. This stuff was just typed down on the machine, just like a typewriter with a drum and sticky tape, and the English came out on the tape."

M.F.H. "What kind of messages were they Can you remember any of them?"

BODE "Oh, all kinds, Army, Air Force, Navy, all sorts. Convoy so-and-so at such and such a place, or, enemy vessels sighted moving so-and-so, or general raid warning for such and such an area. Or then important military staff messages about battle plans. We were officially congratulated after the Dunkirk business; we had told them some things that materially accellerated the campaign. Especially some stuff about a very big tank affair. From the messages e got, we were able to lay a very nice trap; I am afraid it is so long ago, that I can't remember the details".

M.F.H. "About how many messages a day did you have".

BODE "Between 20 and 30 an hour - the average was said to be 22."

M.F.H. "And you deciphered the whole lot?"

BODE "No not everything. They were all put through the machine, but sometimes just nonsense came out. Then we sent those up to Berlin for special treatment".

continued/

M.F.H. "This box with squares - what did it look like?"

BODE "A box made up of ten squares across the top and ten down the side. We just filled in letters - I can't remember quite how."

M.F.H. "This machine of yours - was it anything like that German special cipher machine - what's it called - Enigma or something"?

BODE "Yes, that's the name. I have been trying to remember it all yesterday. Yes, it's like that".

3. The above is the verbatim report of the preliminary conversation regarding this machine breaking of British ciphers. I went into the matter as fully as I could, and it seems probable, that, although the machine used was not in fact a normal Enigma machine, it was of that type, and it seems probable that settings were obtained from Berlin. Unfortunately, BODE, at that time, was a very junior N.C.O., and the knowledge of the machine was very restricted. It was in fact treated very much as our own CX/MSS knowledge. In Bode's opinion all the messages he translated were of the MOST SECRET category and dealt with "High Command" matters.

4. He stated that the man who knows most about it is a certain Sgt.WAGENER of 621 Intercept Coy. at present P.o.W. in Tunisia, as he is the man who used to work the machine.

STOP PRESS.

Information has just been received from C.S.D.I.C. that later yesterday evening, BODE thought he wasn't so very sure about the machine!!

The trouble with BODE is that he is trying to tell us more than he knows and is only too ready to agree with anything one says, or answer anything in the way he thinks one wants it answering. In my opinion, however, the basic facts concerning the use of a machine for deciphering British ciphers are correct, as the information was given very spontaneously, and would hardly make sense to anyone who knew nothing about G.C.&.C.S. sources. There is a possibility of obtainingconfirmation of BODE's story from other members of 621 Intercept Coy. when they arrive in this country for interrogation.

M.I.8.(a) Captain G.S.
21 June, 1943.
MFH/WH

CIPHER AND SIGNALS SECURITY REPORT No. ZIP/D-S/M. 3

From .... D.D. (S)., B.P.

| | B.P. Comment | M.I.8. Comment |
|---|---|---|
| | Reported for information only.<br><br>This is the first specific reference to typex interception we have seen. The type of indicator referred to limits the field to Army and R.A.F. Typex.<br><br>Unfortunately the reply is not available, but since Signals Recce 4 are usually well informed over matters of interception of British traffic, it seems that at least no serious effort is being made by the Germans to cover British Army Typex traffic.<br><br>The last mention of Inspectorate 7/VI was in April 1942 (CX/MSS/1061/T.20) when M.E.A.621 was in communication with them concerning British Army 4-figure intercepts and decodes. | |

and returned to D.D. (S)., B.P., with will also constitute a receipt for

Signed .....

Date 12.2.43

WSBAB 796 20/1 0900

From CODFISH of 20/1/43 [unpublished].

6

(2)

HMSXV 75 21/1 0840

1

An OKH/IN 7/VI Geheim.
Wird engl. 5 B[uchstaben]verfahren, Kenngruppe 1 B/4Z dort bearbeitet od. 5 B-Verfahren, Kenngruppe 1 B/4Z dort bearbeitet oder kann Aufnahme der Sprueche eingestellt werden?

Kdr. d/e Nachrichten Aufklaerung. 4 f Zu zeit (Baloida)

To OKH/IN[?] 7/VI Secret.

Do you deal with English 5-letter [cipher] process, indicator-group 1B/4Z, at your end or with 5-letter [cipher] process, indicator-group 1 B/4Z; or can interception of messages be discontinued?

O.C. "Y" Service.

B/Mch
14 (Secret)
RAF
Army

Note: (1) Probably ATHENS to BERLIN.
(2) 1B/4Z would mean a group of 1 letter + 4 figures. 1 O [i.e.letter "O", not zero] is obscure.

A 1234

A1234

Codfish 20.1.43
Serial No 3/2.c

ZIP/D-S/M.3